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MUTUALITY OF REMEDY IN CALIFORNIA UNDER
CIVIL CODE SECTION 3386
California Civil Code section 3386 provides that:
Neither party to an obligation can be compelled specifically to per-
form it, unless the other party thereto has performed, or is com-
pellable specifically to perform, everything to which the former is
entitled under the same obligation, either completely or nearly so,
together with full compensation for any want of entire performance.
This statute codifies the doctrine of negative mutuality1 developed by
the English text writer, Lord Justice Fry, after his analysis of the
English chancery cases.2  Almost since its inception, Fry's doctrine
has been severely criticized.3 The purpose of this note is not to add
one more voice criticizing Fry's doctrine of mutuality of remedy;
rather, it is to discuss the situations where California Civil Code sec-
tion 3386 has been in issue and to review critically the results
achieved in each situation. It is anticipated that by doing so, a
recommendation can be made on whether the law should be retained,
modified or rejected.
Accepiance and Criticism of Fry's Doctrine
According to one writer, there never was the slightest reason for
the doctrine of mutuality of remedy.4 Yet it had a plausible sound
and therefore was readily adopted by the American courts.5 Until
1900, the courts, almost without exception, applied the doctrine. 6
1 The doctrine of mutuality of performance has both a positive and a
negative aspect. In its positive aspect, mutuality requires that the plaintiff
should be granted specific performance if the defendant would have been
granted specific performance. In the negative aspect is embodied the prin-
ciple that the plaintiff should be denied specific performance if the defendant
could not have obtained it against the plaintiff. Civil Code section 3386 con-
cerns the negative aspect of the mutuality rule. Therefore, all references
made in this note to the doctrine of mutuality of remedy refer to negative
mutuality, not to positive mutuality.
2 Fry stated his doctrine as follows: "A contract to be specifically en-
forced by the court, must be mutual,-that is to say, such that it might, at
the time it was entered into, have been enforced by either of the parties
against the other of them. Whenever, therefore, whether from personal
incapacity, the nature of the contract, or any other cause, the contract is inca-
pable of being enforced against one party, that party is equally incapable of
enforcing it against the other, though its execution in the latter way might in
itself be free from the difficulty, attending its execution in the former." E.
FRY, SPEcIFIc PERFORIANCE OF CONTRACTS 133 (3d ed. 1858).
3 Ames, Mutuality In Specific Performance, 3 CoLum. L. REV. 1 (1903);
Durfee, Mutuality In Specific Performance, 20 McH. L. Rav. 289 (1921);
Stone, The "Mutuality" Rule In New York, 16 COLUm. L. REV. 443 (1916).
4 W. WALSH, A TRA~is. Ox EQum 343 (1930).
5 Id.
6 See generally Lewis, Specific Performance of Contracts-Defense of
Lack of Mutuality (pts. 1-6), 49 Am. L. Rr.G. 270, 383, 447, 507 (1901); 50 id.
at 251, 329 (1902); Lewis, Specific Performance of Contracts Perfecting Title
After Suit Has Begun, 50 Am. L. REG. 523 (1902); Lewis, The Present Status
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Thus a party who sought specific enforcement of a contract and whose
remedy at law was inadequate (thereby satisfying the preliminary
requirement which brought him within equitable cognizance) was
required to show that the situation for which he sought relief met
the requirement of mutuality of remedy.7 If he could not, he was
left to his remedy at law, which by definition was inadequate."
However, as fact situations arose where a strict application of
the rule would precipitate harsh and inequitable decisions, the courts
refused to follow the doctrine in certain cases. Many exceptions
to the rule thus were developed.9 The rule also became the subject
of vigorous attacks by scholars.10 Langdell referred to the doctrine
as being "obscure in principle and extent."11 Lewis made an elabor-
ate review of the cases and concluded that in all of them the appli-
cation of the doctrine had resulted in a manifest denial of justice.
12
Ames, who rejected the rule of mutuality of remedy as being in-
accurate and misleading,13 suggested a rule of mutuality of perform-
ance which he stated as follows:
Equity will not compel specific performance by a defendant if, after
performance, the common law remedy of damages would be his sole
security for the performance of the plaintiff's side of the contract. 14
Durfee joined the others and advocated that the courts should not
be concerned with absolute mutuality, but should allow the doctrine
to be one of the factors to be considered in balancing the equities
between the parties. 5 This theory was also advanced by Walsh.16
Today the doctrine survives in varying degrees across the United
States. The majority of jurisdictions hold that it is fundamental
that before specific performance will be granted mutuality of remedy
must exist.17 However, numerous courts have preferred Durfee's
of the Defense of Want of Mutuality in Specific Performance, 51 AM. L. REG.
591 (1903).
7 H. McCLNTocm, HAmNDoOx or EQUrY 185 (2d ed. 1948).
8 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS,
§ 8 (3d ed. 1926).
9 Ames, supra note 3 (listed eight exceptions); G. CLARK, EQUITY §§
175-80 (3d ed. 1924) (described ten distinct exceptions); J. POMEROY, supra
note 8, §§ 167-73 (listed three exceptions). However, Walsh maintains that
the so-called exceptions to the rule of mutuality are in no sense exceptions,
but demonstrate that the rule as laid down by Fry "is unsound in principle
and contrary to actual law. Together these so called 'exceptions' cover the
field." W. WALSH, supra note 4, at 345.
10 Ames, supra note 3; Durfee, supra note 3.
11 Langdell, Equity, Specific Performance, Mutuality of Remedy, 1 HAZv.
L. REv. 104 (1887).
12 Articles by Lewis, supra note 6.
13 Ames, supra note 3, at 8.
14 Id. at 2-3.
15 Durfee, supra note 3, at 312-14.
16 W. WALSH, supra note 4, at 354.
17 Pierce v. Watson, 252 Ala. 15, 39 So. 2d 220 (1949); Graham County
Elec. Cooperative v. Town of Safford, 95 Ariz. 174, 388 P.2d 169 (1963);
Duclos v. Turner, 204 Ark. 1000, 166 S.W.2d 251 (1942); Howard Cole & Co.
v. Williams, 157 Fla. 851, 27 So. 2d 352 (1946); Pierce v. Rush, 210 Ga. 718, 82
S.E.2d 649 (1954); Schultz v. Campbell, 147 Mont. 417, 413 P.2d 879 (1966);
Electronic Dev. Co. v. Robson, 148 Neb. 526, 28 N.W.2d 130 (1947); Knox v.
Allard, 90 N.H. 157, 5 A.2d 716 (1939); Sarokohan v. Fair Lawn Memorial
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theory that mutuality is merely a discretionary tool to be used in
balancing the equities. 8 In an increasing number of jurisdictions
the doctrine of mutuality has been expressly repudiated. 9 Where
this is so, specific performance will be granted whenever the decree
will operate to give both parties the benefits of the contract.
Although there is a split of authority, it can be said that a
substantial number of jurisdictions concur with California in holding
that mutuality of remedy is essential to the successful maintenance
of a suit for specific performance. 20 However, it does not follow
that a rule is sound merely because it is adhered to in a substantial
number of jurisdictions. Such a determination depends upon an
analysis of the results achieved when the rule is applied. If the rule
does not operate unreasonably to deprive the plaintiff of his bar-
gained-for performance, but does operate to guarantee that the de-
fendant shall not later be harmed by granting specific performance
against him, the rule should be retained. If this is not the result, it
should be rejected or modified.
Two questions are relevant in an analysis of California's appli-
cation of Civil Code section 3386: In what factual situations has
Civil Code section 3386 been an issue? What have been the accom-
panying results?
Where the Plaintiff Has Substantially Performed
A major exception to the doctrine of mutuality of remedy that
applies to all factual situations is provided in Civil Code section 3392.
This statute provides as follows:
Specific performance cannot be enforced in favor of a party who has
not fully and fairly performed all the conditions precedent on his part
to the obligation of the other party, except where his failure to per-
form is only partial, and either entirely immaterial, or capable of
being fully compensated, in which case specific performance may be
Hosp., Inc., 83 N.J. Super. 127, 199 A.2d 52 (Super. Ct. 1964); Zundel v,
Farmers Grain Co., 79 N.W.2d 48 (N.D. 1956); Thompson v. Giddings, 276
P.2d 229 (Okla. 1954); Erkess v. Eisenthal, 354 Pa. 161, 47 A.2d 154 (1946);
Carr v. Ott, 38 Tenn. App. 585, 277 S.W.2d 419 (1954); Burr v. Greenland,
356 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Genola Town v. Santagnin City, 96
Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930 (1938); Pair v. Rook, 195 Va. 196, 77 S.E.2d 395 (1953);
McGinnis v. Enslow, 140 W. Va. 99, 82 S.E.2d 437 (1954); Beatty v. Chicago
B. & O.R.R., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404 (1935).
18 Zelliken v. Lynch, 80 Kan. 746, 104 P. 563 (1909); Peterson v. Johnson
Nut Co., 204 Minn. 300, 283 N.W. 561 (1939); Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490,
283 N.W. 861 (1922); Ward v. Bickerstaff, 79 Ohio App. 362, 73 N.E.2d 877
(1946).
19 Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Tom Livizos Real Estate, Inc., 210 A.2d 299
(Del. Ch. 1965); Gould v. Stelter, 14 Ill. 2d 376, 152 N.E.2d 869 (1958); Urbain
v. Speak, 258 Iowa 584, 139 N.W.2d 311 (1966) ;.Messina v. Moeller, 214 Md.
110, 133 A.2d 75 (1957); Morad v. Silva, 331 Mass. 94, 117 N.E.2d 290 (1954);
Reinink v. Van Loozenoord, 370 Mich. 121, 121 N.W.2d 689 (1963); Cooley v.
Stevens, 240 Miss. 581, 128 So. 2d 124 (1961); Beets v. Tyler, 290 S.W.2d 76
(Mo. 1956); Harman v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 79 Nev. 4, 377 P.2d 622
(1963); Vanzandt v. Heilman, 54 N.M. 97, 214 P.2d 864 (1950); Paullus v.
Yarbrough, 219 Ore. 611, 347 P.2d 620 (1959); First Nat'l Bank v. Laperle, 117
Vt. 144, 86 A.2d 635 (1952).
20 Cases cited note 17 supra.
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compelled, upon full compensation being made for the default.
Thus, where the plaintiff has substantially performed, the doctrineof mutuality will not be invoked to deny him specific performance.21It has been held that when the plaintiff agrees to pave a street22 orto render professional services23 in exchange for an interest in land,he may obtain a decree of specific performance under this statute,
so long as he has substantially performed.
In many cases, the courts have reached the same result withoutrelying upon Civil Code section 3392.24 The courts have held thatwhere the plaintiff has substantially performed personal services andthe only impediment to full performance is impossibility due to theforces of nature 2 5 or due to the defendant's breach,20 the doctrineof mutuality of remedy does not apply. The reasoning here is that,although the contract could not have been specifically enforced whenit was executed, it could be so enforced if it were fully performed bythe plaintiff. Since his performance was prevented by somethingbeyond the plaintiff's control, "it must be considered to have beensufficiently performed, within the meaning of Civil Code section 3386
.... -7 A close reading of Civil Code section 3386 justifies thisresult; the section does not require full performance in all instances,provided there is nearly full performance and "full compensation
for want of entire performance ......
Both the statutory exception and the court-made exception arereasonable. In such situations, the defendant has received substan-
tially all the benefits of his bargain, and should the plaintiff laterfail to perform the remainder of the contract, it is quite likely thatdamages could adequately compensate the defendant for the smallmeasure of performance he did not receive. Even if the defendant's
remedy were not entirely adequate, it is not nearly so inadequate asthat of the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff has received none of theunique benefits of the contract, any damages he would receive inan action at law would be inadequate. The defendant has receivedsubstantially all the benefits for which he contracted, making hisremedy at law only slightly inadequate. Also, the past conduct of theplaintiff indicates his good faith, since he has substantially performed
his part of the bargain. Although his past good faith does not guar-antee that he will continue to perform, it does appear extremelyunlikely that he would breach the contract after the jurisdiction
of the court is removed. For these reasons it seems apparent thatthe defendant will suffer no injustice by the court enforcing the con-tract against him, and specific performance is properly granted in
such cases.
As was previously mentioned, substantial performance is a major
exception to the doctrine of mutuality of remedy. Therefore, the
2I Butterfield v. Gentles, 9 Cal. 2d 275, 70 P.2d 613 (1937).
22 Id.
23 Howard v. Throckmorton, 48 Cal. 482 (1874).
24 Thurber v. Meves, 119 Cal. 35, 50 P. 1063 (1897); Nevada Bank v.
Steinmitz, 64 Cal. 301, 30 P. 970 (1882); Stone v. Burke, 110 Cal. App. 2d 748,
244 P.2d 51 (1952).
25 Furtinata v. Butterfield, 14 Cal. App. 25, 110 P. 962 (1910).
26 Ambrose v. Alioto, 65 Cal. App. 2d 362, 150 P.2d 502 (1944).
27 Id. at 370, 150 P.2d at 505.
following discussion is predicated upon the assumption that there has
not been substantial performance.
Where the Performance on the Part of the Plaintiff Is Impossible
A request for specific performance has been denied where the
action of a third party has made the plaintiff's performance impos-
sible.28  In such a case, the equities are with the defendant, since to
require him to perform would leave no hope that he would receive
his bargained-for counter performance. Specific performance is like-
wise denied where the plaintiff's performance requires action by third
persons.29 I-Here too it is correct to deny this extraordinary relief,
since the defendant would have but a bare hope that the counter
performance would be received. Equity tries to avoid such situations
and the application of Civil Code section 3386 achieves this just result,
because it requires that the plaintiff's performance be specifically
enforceable.
Where the Performance by the Plaintiff Was Impossible at the Time
the Contract Was Executed but Is Possible at the Time of Suit
In California" and most other states31 the appropriate time
for determining whether a contract lacks mutuality of remedy is
at the time its enforcement is sought and not the time of its exe-
cution. It follows that if the plaintiff can perform at the time he
filed the action, the fact that his performance was impossible when
the contract was made should not bar his action for specific perform-
ance. This has been the result in the cases that have dealt with the
problem.32
In some of these cases, the defendant knew when the contract
was executed that the plaintiff could not then perform.33 The courts
indicated that because of this knowledge on the part of the defendant
.they would make an exception to the doctrine of mutuality of remedy,
apparently on the theory that it was a risk assumed by the de-
fendant.34 While the result is correct, this theory is unsound.
28 By-Products Fuel Mach. Co. v. Dawson, 110 Cal. App. 214, 294 P. 19
(1930).
29 Boys Town U.S.A., Inc. v. The World Church, 221 Cal. App. 2d 468, 34
Cal. Rptr. 498 (1963); Sesma v. Ellis, 38 Cal. App. 2d 139, 100 P.2d 816 (1940).
30 Jones v. Clark, 19 Cal. 2d 156, 119 P.2d 731 (1941); Thurber v. Meves,
119 Cal. 35, 50 P. 1063 (1897); Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal. App. 2d 468, 46
Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965); Stone v. Burke, 110 Cal. App. 2d 748, 244 P.2d 51 (1952);
Van Fossen v. Yager, 65 Cal. App. 2d 591, 151 P.2d 14 (1944).
31 E.g., Pierce v. Watson, 252 Ala. 15, 39 So. 2d 220 (1949); Howard Cole
& Co. v. Williams, 157 Fla. 851, 27 So. 2d 352 (1946); Gould v. Stelter, 14 IMI.
2d 376, 152 N.E.2d 869 (1958); Safeway Systems, Inc. v. Manuel Bros., Inc.,
228 A.2d 851, (R.I. 1967); First Nat'l Bank v. Laperle, 117 Vt. 144, 86 A.2d 635
(1952).
32 Dore v. Southern Pac. Co., 163 Cal. 182, 124 P. 817 (1912); Wolff v.
Cloyne, 156 Cal. 746, 106 P. 104 (1909); Wolleson v. Coburn, 63 Cal. App. 315,
218 P. 479 (1923). See also G. CLAMR, supra note 9, § 179.
33 Dore v. Southern Pac. Co., 163 Cal. 182, 124 P. 817 (1912); Wolleson
v. Coburn, 63 Cal. App. 315, 218 P. 479 (1923).
34 Wolleson v. Coburn, 63 Cal. App. 315, 218 P. 479 (1923).
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Civil Code section 3386 contains no exception for a defendant who had
knowledge that the plaintiff's performance was impossible when the
contract was formed. Instead, all the statute requires is that it
be possible to assure the plaintiff's performance by a decree of specific
performance. By judicial interpretation, the assurance must be at
the time of suit.3 5 Therefore, what occurred before the filing of the
suit is of no consequence. The result is a desirable one, since each
party is assured of receiving the performance for which he contracted.
Where the Defendant Cannot Compel Specific Performance Because
of His Own Fault
It is well established that the doctrine of mutuality of remedy
does not apply where specific performance is unavailable to the de-
fendant due to his own fault.3 6 This was the law in California,37 until
the much criticized 33 case of Linehan v. Devincense.3 9 In that case,
the court denied a vendee specific performance because his vendor
could not have specifically enforced the contract, due to a defect
in his title. The court allowed the defendant "to plead his own
fault as a reason for refusing to enforce the contract as far as it
may yet be performed.
'40
Fortunately, the case was overruled by Miller v. Dyer,41 where
a buyer sought specific performance and abatement of a contract to
sell land against his seller who had an imperfect title. The seller
contended that since he could not have forced the defective title
upon an unwilling buyer, mutuality of remedy was lacking and spe-
cific performance must be denied. The court, in granting specific
performance and abatement, held that what was said in Linehan v.
Devincense "was not necessary to the decision of the case" 42 and was
"without support of the authorities." 43  Thus, this well-established
exception to the doctrine of mutuality was returned to California.
Where the Plaintiff Is Seeking To Exercise an Option Granted
by the Defendant
A universally recognized exception to the doctrine of mutuality
is the conditional or option contract.44 The California courts hold that
if the party to whom the offer is made accepts within the allotted
time, there is a mutual contract which he may then enforce, although
he himself could not have been proceeded against for specific per-
35 Cases cited note 30 supra.
36 G. CLARK, supra note 9, § 179; J. PoMERoY, supra note 8, § 434.
37 Smiddy v. Grafton, 163 Cal. 16, 124 P. 433 (1912); Farnum v. Clarke,
148 Cal. 610, 84 P. 166 (1906); Easton v. Montgomery, 90 Cal. 307, 27 P. 280
(1891).
38 E.g., Comment, Specific Performance of Contracts for the Sale of Land
with Abatement of Purchase Price for Defects and Deficiencies in the Ven-
dor's Title, 16 CAIr. L. REV. 541, 543 (1528).
30 170 Cal. 307, 149 P. 584 (1915).
40 Comment, supra note 38.
41 20 Cal. 2d 526, 127 P.2d 901 (1942).
42 Id. at 530, 127 P.2d at 903.
43 Id.
44 G. CLARK, supra note 9, § 178; J. POMEROY, supra note 8, at 169.
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formance prior to his acceptance.4 5 Invariably it is a contract of sale
of land or unique chattels. If the offeree's consideration is the pay-
ment of money and/or the giving of security, the performance of
which can be enforced in equity, the court will grant the offeree spe-
cific performance. 46 However, the courts will refuse specific perform-
ance if the offeree's consideration is to render personal services. 47 In
either situation, the fact that the contract grew out of an option agree-
ment is of no importance, for it is the rights and duties of the parties
under the resulting contract that determine whether either party may
obtain its specific performance. Therefore, option contracts, although
stated to be an exception to the doctrine of mutuality, appear to
be an exception without legal significance.
48
Where the Plaintiff Has Not Complied with the Statute of Frauds
Mutuality of remedy will be found where a contract within the
Statute of Frauds is oral or is written but unsigned by the plaintiff,
if the plaintiff has substantially performed, 49 has partially performed,5 0
has offered to perform, 51 or has brought an action to compel
performance. 52 In each of these situations the exception is justified,
since the defendant is assured that the plaintiff will not resort to
the defense of the Statute of Frauds, but will perform. It then seems
probable that the plaintiff will fulfill his obligations under the con-
tract because he has manifested his intention to perform by bringing
suit and because he has partially performed, substantially performed,
or offered to perform.53 With the plaintiff's performance thus as-
sured, the courts may reasonably take the position that mutuality
exists. Obviously, none of the above exceptions to the doctrine of
mutuality apply where the party signing the contract has withdrawn
therefrom before the tender of performance or commencement of the
suit by the party who did not comply with the Statute of Frauds, be-
cause there does not then exist the degree of performance required to
give rise to the exceptions.
54
45 Schmidt v. Beckelnan, 187 Cal. App. 2d 462, 9 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1960);
Caras v. Parker, 149 Cal. App. 2d 621, 309 P.2d 104 (1957); Jonas v. Leland,
77 Cal. App. 2d 770, 176 P.2d 764 (1947).
46 See Caras v. Parker, 149 Cal. App. 2d 621, 309 P.2d 104 (1957).
47 See Archer v. Miller, 73 Cal. App. 678, 239 P. 92 (1925).
48 See Note, 13 COLM. L. REv. 737, 738 (1913).
49 Jonas v. Clark, 19 Cal. 2d 156, 119 P.2d 731 (1941); Van Fossen v.
Yager, 65 Cal. App. 2d 591, 151 P.2d 14 (1944).
50 Copple v. Aigeltinger, 167 Cal. 706, 140 P. 1073 (1914); Boehle v. Ben-
son, 150 Cal. App. 2d 696, 310 P.2d 650 (1957); Gibbs v. Mendoza, 103 Cal.
App. 183, 284 P. 250 (1930).
51 Bird v. Potter, 146 Cal. 286, 79 P. 970 (1905); Sayward v. Houghton,
119 Cal. 545, 51 P. 853 (1897); Vassault v. Edwards, 43 Cal. 458 (1872).
52 Ellis v. Mihelis, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 32 Cal. Rptr. 415, 384 P.2d 7 (1963);
King v. Stanley, 32 Cal. 2d 584, 197 P.2d 321 (1948); Copple v. Aigeltinger,
167 Cal. 706, 140 P. 1073 (1914); Harper v. Goldschmidt, 156 Cal. 245, 104 P.
451 (1909).
53 Austin, Mutuality of Remedy in Ohio: A Journey From Abstraction to
Particularism, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 629, 642 (1967).
54 Nason v. Lingle, 143 Cal. 363, 77 P. 71 (1904); Hay v. Mason, 141 Cal.
722, 75 P. 300 (1904); Seymour v. Shaeffer, 82 Cal. App. 2d 823, 187 P.2d 95
(1947).
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Where the Plaintiff Has the Option To Terminate the Contract
at Will or Upon Short Notice
Based on the equitable doctrine that equity will not do a vain
thing, equity will not grant a decree of specific performance which
could later be made nugatory by action of the parties.55 Thus, if
the defendant has the option to terminate the contract at will or
with notice, a decree of specific performance will not be granted.5 6
This is quite rational so far as it pertains to the defendant's right
to terminate. But "[p]artly from confusion with this principle,
partly for alleged lack of mutuality, specific performance has been
refused in a number of cases because the plaintiff had a power
given him under the contract to terminate it after a certain time
.)257 This result has been severely criticized.58 Nevertheless, the
California cases have uniformly held that a contract giving such a
power to the plaintiff to terminate at will" or with notice 60 will
not be specifically enforced. The result is an unreasonable one. The
plaintiff sues for a decree of specific performance to obtain the bene-
fits of the contract, not to bring the benefits to an end as soon as
the decree is granted. Can it be said that such a decree is nugatory?
Second, the doctrine of mutuality does not demand that each party
benefit equally, but only that they have equal remedies.6 ' Third, is
it fair to allow the defendant to raise as a defense a clause that he
assented to, thereby requiring the plaintiff to sue at law for damages
which by definition are inadequate, when it is probable that the
plaintiff has given additional consideration for the power to termi-
nate? Since the result cannot be supported by reason and operates
to deny the plaintiff the benefits for which he has contracted, the
doctrine should be sparingly applied in such cases. Only in those
rare situations where it might create a hardship on the defendant's
part should the doctrine be applied.6 2 In all other cases, reason should
rule and the doctrine should not.
Where the Contract Requires Performance on the Part of the
Plaintiff That Has Traditionally Been Beyond Equity's
Jurisdiction
The cases within this category most vividly portray the inequita-
ble results that follow from a strict application of the doctrine of
negative mutuality.6 3 Within this category we find contracts requir-
ing the plaintiff to perform construction work or to perform personal
55 Carver v. Brien, 315 Ill. App. 643, 43 N.E.2d 597 (1942).
56 S. WILLISTON, CONiACTS § 1442 (1924).
57 Id.
58 W. WALSH, supra note 4, at 354; S. WILLIsToN, supra note 56.
59 George v. Weston, 26 Cal. App. 2d 256, 79 P.2d 110 (1938); Scheel v.
Harr, 27 Cal. App. 2d 345, 80 P.2d 1035 (1938); Moore v. Heron, 108 Cal. App.
705, 292 P. 136 (1930); Dabney v. Key, 57 Cal. App. 762, 207 P. 921 (1922).
60 Sturgis v. Galindo, 59 Cal. 28 (1881); Sheehan v. Vedder 108 Cal. App.
419, 292 P. 175 (1930).
61 Cf. G. CLARK, supra note 9, § 174.
2 S. WI.LISTON, supra note 56, § 1442.
63 See Pacific Elec. Ry. v. Campbell-Johnston, 153 Cal. 106, 94 P. 623
(1908); Moklofsky v. Moklofsky, 79 Cal. App. 2d 259, 179 P.2d 628 (1947).
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services for an indefinite period of time. Since Civil Code section 3386
requires that the plaintiff be "compellable specifically to perform,
everything" and since performance of this nature has traditionally
been considered by equity to be beyond its power to compel, it
necessarily follows that the court will deny specific performance to
the plaintiff in these cases.6 4 The problem, as will be seen, is not
the inability of the court to guarantee that the plaintiff will per-
form, but the inability to guarantee such performance by a decree of
specific performance. In most cases the result is a harsh one.
Pacific Electric Railway Co. v. CampbeU-Johnston5 is a classic
example of the injustice that results from such a strict application of
the doctrine. In that case the defendant agreed to convey to the
plaintiff a right of way over land that separated Los Angeles and
Pasadena. In return, the plaintiff promised to construct, maintain,
and operate a railroad between Los Angeles and Pasadena. After
the plaintiff had performed the major part of its obligation by con-
structing and operating its line from said cities to the boundaries on
either side of the land in question, the defendant refused to permit
any construction over the lands. In denying a decree of specific
performance, the court said, "neither the refusal of the defendants to
permit construction over their lands, nor the willingness of the plain-
tiff to do so have any bearing in the application of the equitable
principle that where there is no mutuality of remedy there can be
no decree for specific performance."' 6 6 The court then went on to dis-
cuss the application of Civil Code section 3386, holding that the test
is "if it appears that the right to this remedy is not reciprocal, it is
not available to either party . . . . "67 This is the spirit and literal
meaning of Civil Code section 3386 and consequently it is not un-
natural that the court reached such an unjust decision.
The decision was unjust, not only because the result was harsh,
but also because it is not supported by reason. What harm might
come to the defendant by specifically enforcing the contract against
him? The plaintiff has demonstrated his willingness to perform by
bringing suit and also by completing a major part of the continuous
line and operating it up to the boundaries of the defendant's land.
Certainly the plaintiff has a strong economic interest in carrying out
the contract, due to his extensive investment of funds and labor
and to the fact that it would have been wasteful to reroute the rail-
way. With such an economic interest, his default appears extremely
unlikely.68 Therefore, the defendant was assured of receiving the per-
formance for which he had contracted. Even if the court still doubted
that the plaintiff's performance would be forthcoming, it could have
issued a conditional decree providing that the deed would be de-
livered upon the completion of the line across the defendant's land.
Unfortunately, such decisions are not rare under California Civil
Code section 3386. In other cases the courts, relying upon this code
section, have denied specific performance where the plaintiff per-
64 Id.
65 153 Cal. 106, 94 P. 623 (1908).
66 Id. at 116, 94 P. at 627.
67 Id. at 112, 94 P. at 626.
68 See Austin, supra note 53, at 642.
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formed extensive construction work and all that remained to be done
was the making of a doorway69 or the construction of a stairway,70
neither requiring very much time nor effort. These cases did not
come within the substantial performance exception.71 Since the
plaintiff has demonstrated his good faith by partly performing, it is
highly improbable that he will breach the contract once the jurisdic-
tion of the court is lifted.72  Even if the plaintiff did refuse to per-
form, the defendant's remedy at law would be adequate, for he could
have the stairway or doorway completed by another and sue the
plaintiff for the appropriate damages. However, the plain meaning
of Civil Code section 3386 demands that specific performance be de-
nied, since the plaintiff's performance may not be assured by a decree
of specific performance. With this clear and unambiguous rule of
law glaring at the courts, it is not difficult to understand how they
are forced to render such inequitable decisions. The courts have been
so influenced by the literal meaning of Civil Code section 3386 that
they have even refused to grant a conditional decree,73 which appears
to be a practicable method to guarantee the plaintiff's performance.
Yet these results may be expected, so long as California has a statute
demanding such decisions.
Where the plaintiff is not required to build, but to perform per-
sonal services for an indefinite time, the courts have consistently
denied specific performance.74 An example is a contract requiring
the plaintiff to care for an aged defendant until the defendant's
death, in return for the defendant's promise to devise his property to
the plaintiff.75 Another example is contracts requiring the plaintiff
to organize and promote a corporation for the development of natural
resources and to receive land or stocks in return.76 A possible
answer in these situations would be to require the defendant to place
the deed in escrow with instructions that it not be delivered until
the plaintiff has performed. However, the courts have not adopted
this approach, but instead they have denied equitable relief, thereby
forcing the plaintiff to accept an inadequate remedy at law.77 Such
a result is required under the clear meaning of Civil Code section
3386, there being no authority in the statute for the court to guarantee
the plaintiff's performance in any manner other than by a decree of
specific performance. This strait-jacket statute obviously deters the
69 Johnson v. Wunner, 40 Cal. App. 484, 181 P. 103 (1919).
70 Moklofsky v. Moklofsky, 79 Cal. App. 2d 259, 179 P.2d 628 (1947).
71 Discussed in the text following footnote 21 supra. It is possible that
some of the reasoning that supported the substantial performance exception
is equally applicable to the factual situations discussed above.
72 Austin, supra note 53, at 636.
73 Moklofsky v. Moklofsky, 79 Cal. App. 2d 259, 179 P.2d 628 (1947).
74 Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 P. 542 (1920); Los Angeles & Bakersfield
Oil & Dev. Co. v. Occidental Oil Co., 144 Cal. 528, 78 P. 25 (1904); O'Brien v.
Perry, 130 Cal. 526, 62 P. 927 (1900).
75 Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 P. 542 (1920); O'Brien v. Perry, 130 Cal.
526, 62 P. 927 (1900); Tompkins v. Hoge, 114 Cal. App. 2d 257, 250 P.2d 174
(1952); Van Core v. Bodner, 77 Cal. App. 2d 842, 176 P.2d 784 (1947).
76 Los Angeles & Bakersfield Oil & Dev. Co. v. Occidental Oil Co., 144
Cal. 528, 78 P. 25 (1904); Rautenberg v. Westland, 227 Cal. App. 2d 566, 38
Cal. Rptr. 797 (1964); Hupp v. Lawler, 106 Cal. App. 121, 288 P. 801 (1930).
77 Cases cited notes 74 & 75 supra.
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courts from protecting the defendant in any other manner, such as
by a conditional decree or the posting of a security bond.
Conclusion
In all of the above situations, the exceptions to Civil Code section
3386 have been justified, because the defendant is assured of the
plaintiff's performance; therefore, no injustice is done to the de-
fendant by specifically enforcing the contract against him. But as
was discussed, the courts, by enforcing Civil Code section 3386 to the
letter, have in numerous other cases failed to realize that no in-
justice would come to the defendant by specifically enforcing the
contract against him, since he was or could be substantially assured
that the plaintiff would perform. Logic demands that whenever
the plaintiff's performance is assured, specific performance should
be granted whether the case comes within one of the exceptions to
the doctrine of mutuality or not.
It is submitted that more equitable results can be achieved only
by the repeal of Civil Code section 3386. But the mere repeal of this
statute will not assure the judicial death of Fry's doctrine, since the
doctrine is so well established in California. Therefore, in its place
should be substituted a law that embodies the advantages of the
old law and none of the unjust consequences that have been described
in this note. The following would accomplish this result:
Specific performance may properly be refused if a significant
part of the agreed exchange for the performance to be com-
pelled is as yet unperformed and its concurrent or future
performance is not well secured or can not be secured to the
satisfaction of the court.
78
If such a provision were in the California Civil Code, specific
performance could be granted, although the plaintiff had not com-
pleted the railway, stairway, or doorway. This result would be
reached because the factual situation clearly indicates that the plain-
tiff has such an economic interest in the completion of the work
that it would be prodigal for him not to complete his performance.
In other situations, the past conduct of the plaintiff would provide
the necessary assurance. If this were not sufficient, the court could
require the plaintiff to post a security bond or could issue a condi-
tional decree. Perhaps the only complaint with such a statute is
that it could not act retroactively to cure the harsh results that
have followed from the application of Civil Code section 3386.
James D. Cox*
78 This recommendation was derived from the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 373 (1932), with modifications being made to accomplish the desired results
discussed in the text. The California Supreme Court indicated this is the ap-
propriate guideline when Justice Gibson said: "[T]he only important consid-
eration is whether a court of equity which is asked to specifically enforce a
contract against the defendant is able to assure that he will receive the agreed
performance from the plaintiff." Ellis v. Milhelis, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 215, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 415, 420, 384 P.2d 7, 12 (1963). However, this was dictum, since the case
fell within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of negative mutuality.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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